10. Bereshit — Abarbanel on the Torah, Section 10

Original Vision, Independent Form

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However, this opinion in its entirety contradicts the testimony of the Torah’s writings, distorts, and opposes the words of our sages, and this is for several reasons. First, the verse says, “Let there be light” (Yehi Or) cannot be interpreted as referring merely to God’s thought or decree. The word “Yehi” (let there be) always signifies actual existence, as seen in “Let there be a firmament” (Yehi Rakia) and “Let there be luminaries” (Yehi Me’orot). Thus, it must refer to the actual creation of light, not just its conception in divine thought¹. Furthermore, our Sages taught (Avot 5:1): “The world was created with ten utterances,” and the first of these is “Let there be light.” If nothing was actually created at that moment, then this would not be one of the ten utterances by which the world was created, since all the other utterances brought something into actual existence². Moreover, God’s knowledge of light prior to its creation, and His intention to create it, should not have been recorded in the Torah, nor should it be assigned to the first day of creation. If one were to speak of God’s prior knowledge, then even before the creation of time itself (if such a measurement is even possible), every part of creation was already known and conceived in His wisdom. Why, then, would the Torah assign God’s knowledge of light before its creation to a specific day and time?

Additionally, why would the act of the first day be only conceptual, while the acts of the other days were actual and tangible? The language of the Torah is identical across all the days of creation, without any distinction between conceptual decrees and actual creation³. Why would the Torah describe two separate utterances regarding light—one referring to its thought before creation, and another to its actual creation? Nowhere else in the creation narrative do we find such a distinction. Moreover, why would God’s decree to create light be placed on day one, while its actual creation would be delayed until the fourth day? Was God’s power insufficient to create it immediately upon His decree⁴? Finally, if “Let there be light” (Yehi Or) merely expressed God’s thought of creation, what would be the meaning of “And there was light” (Vayehi Or)? Even though the phrase “And it was so” (Vayehi Ken) is not used here, the wording necessitates that “And there was light” refers to actual creation. Otherwise, “And there was light” would be entirely redundant, an unnecessary repetition.

Furthermore, if there was no actual light in existence on the first day, how could there have been evening and morning, as it is stated: “And there was evening, and there was morning, one day”? This same phrase appears for all the days of Bereshit. The only way to justify this would be to claim that everything was imaginary or purely intellectual, without actual reality—which would imply that the entire creation of the world was an illusion. There is no greater heresy than this! All of this demonstrates that the claim of this scholar—according to Maimonides’ interpretation—has no validity, and “the helper has stumbled, and the aided one has fallen” (Isaiah 31:3). Additionally, there is a third difficulty regarding Maimonides’ view, namely, the verse: “And God separated, etc.” If the distinction between light and darkness was merely a result of the motion of the celestial sphere, then the Torah should not have attributed this action to God. Notice that in the creation of the luminaries, the light is explicitly assigned to them, as it is written: “To separate between the light and the darkness.” They were the true agents of separation, not the Blessed Creator.

Moreover, as I have previously explained, the Torah always attributes events to their immediate causes, not to their remote ones, because knowledge of distant causes does not provide a complete understanding. It is astonishing that these scholars sought support from the Talmudic statement: “These are the same luminaries that were created on the first day but were not suspended until the fourth day.” This source clearly states that the luminaries were actually created on the first day, but they were not placed and did not function in their orbits until the fourth day. How can this be reconciled with their claim that it refers only to the manifestation of their effects, or to some imagined concept?

Furthermore, it is evident that this contradicts the view of the Sages, as explained in Bereshit Rabbah⁵. Rabbi Levi, in the name of Rabbi Chama bar Chanina, taught: “The Holy One, Blessed be He, created three things on each day: On the first day: the heavens, the earth, and light. On the second day: the firmament, the angels, and Gehinnom. On the third day: grasses, trees, and the Garden of Eden. On the fourth day: the sun, the moon, and the constellations. On the fifth day: birds, fish, and the Leviathan. On the sixth day: Adam, Eve, and creeping creatures.” This explicitly states that light was created in actuality on the first day, just as the heavens and earth were, while the luminaries were created only on the fourth day. All of this proves that the light mentioned on the first day is not the same as the light of the luminaries. What, then, is its nature? Who will give me wisdom to understand?

Next section → The Enigma of the First Light

1. In biblical Hebrew, Yehi always denotes something coming into existence rather than a mere intention to create. Abarbanel uses this linguistic argument to refute the idea that light was merely conceptual on the first day.

2. The Mishnah (Avot 5:1) states that the world was created with ten divine utterances. Abarbanel argues that if “Let there be light” did not produce something tangible, it could not be counted among them. Since all the other utterances brought forth an actual created entity, this one too must have effected the emergence of a real, created light, and not merely the establishment of an order or potential.

3. Abarbanel uses theological reasoning to argue that delaying the actual creation of light contradicts the fundamental omnipotence of God, implying that what He decrees is realized immediately.

4. Abarbanel challenges the view that the first day’s creation was conceptual, while the other days were physical, emphasizing that the Torah maintains a consistent linguistic pattern throughout the creation narrative.

5. Bereshit Rabbah 3:9.