2. Bereshit — Abarbanel on the Torah, Section 2
Abarbanel’s Four Objections to the Doctrine of Primordial Matter
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Difficulties with This Approach
First, how can the Torah state that God created the heavens and the earth if it merely refers to the creation of primordial matter (hyle)? After all, the hyle—the raw substance of a thing—is the lowest aspect of its existence. How can this simple matter be called by the complete and composite name of “heavens and earth”? Even more so, how could it be referred to with the definite article (”the heavens and the earth”)? This phrase can only refer to something perceived, tangible, and well-known, not to an abstract, lacking, and imperceptible primordial substance that did not even exist in its formless state for more than a fleeting moment.
Second, how is it possible for two separate, formless substances to be created ex nihilo and yet be distinct from one another? Distinction arises from form and function, yet if these substances were entirely without form, how could they be considered separate entities? This aligns with the philosopher’s statement that “that which is in potential cannot be distinguished from another thing that is in potential.”
Third, we see that specific forms were also created ex nihilo (yesh me’ayin) in the act of creation. If so, why does the Torah mention the creation of the formless substances but not that of the forms? One cannot argue that the forms were already embedded in the potential of these substances, as Bereishit Rabbah holds regarding material forms, for this is not a true opinion—especially concerning the human form, regarding which all authorities agree, including Bereishit Rabbah himself, that it is not derived from hyle. Even more so, such reasoning is entirely inapplicable to the celestial spheres (galgalim). Whether one holds that they possess souls or separate intellects, it is impossible to suggest that their existence was contained within the potential of matter.
And fourth, our sages have received the tradition that everything created during the Six Days of Creation was brought into existence in its complete and perfected state: “They were created in their full stature, in their complete form, and in their full wisdom.”
It is astonishing that these sacred commentators—what compelled them to adopt this strained interpretation, suggesting that at first, formless, potential matter was created without form, and that all things later emerged from it?
According to this, those original substances (hyle) could not have been created as mere formless, potential matter without any shape, but rather, they must have been created in their proper form, with their completed structure. And it is astonishing that these sacred commentators—what compelled them to adopt this strained interpretation, suggesting that at first, formless, potential matter was created without form, and that all things later emerged from it? Would it not have been more appropriate to assume that all things were created fully formed and complete from the outset? Why did they choose this view? Is it because the philosophers posited the existence of a primordial, potential substance (hyle) as the underlying matter for all natural existence? Did they seek to align with philosophical reasoning, which holds that becoming (happening) cannot occur from something already actualized, nor can existence emerge from absolute nonexistence? Thus, they accepted the idea that all existence must first require a material substrate—something that exists in potentiality—serving as an intermediary between existence and nonexistence.
However, the portion of Jacob is not like this! For we believe that the world came into being not from any pre-existing substance, but rather, it emerged following absolute nonexistence (ex nihilo). Therefore, there is no need to assume the existence of primordial matter preceding the initial act of creation. Rabbeinu Nissim, however, made an effort in his discourses to present two reasons for why primordial matter was necessary:
First, the Holy One, Blessed be He, wished for the first act of creation to proceed in a way that followed the natural order, rather than bringing multiple things into being from absolute nothingness. Therefore, He first created a single shared substance, from which all lower entities would emerge, and likewise a separate primordial substance from which the upper celestial entities would be formed—since the form of the celestial spheres could not exist in the same material as earthly matter.
Second, the existence of a single, shared primordial matter for all lower beings ensured that humans would be able to sustain themselves from plants and animals—since all things were created for mankind’s benefit. This would not have been possible unless all things on earth originated from a common substance.
But these reasons are not necessary, because even if one accepts his argument regarding the lower beings—that they must have a shared material substance due to their coming into existence and perishing, and because they serve as food for man—what about the celestial beings?1 They do not experience coming into existence or perishing, and they are not food for man. Why then would they require a shared primordial substance?
Next section → Creation ex Nihilo and the Sovereignty of Divine Will
Abarbanel challenges the idea that all created beings must share either permanence (eternity) or mutability (decay). His critique is based on the Aristotelian model of the cosmos, which classified celestial bodies as eternal and incorruptible, while terrestrial elements were subject to decay and change. Abarbanel rejects the necessity of this distinction, asserting that God’s will alone determines whether a creation is eternal or perishable.