Bereshit (2)

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Difficulties with This Approach

First, how can the Torah state that God created the heavens and the earth if it merely refers to the creation of primordial matter (hyle)? After all, the hyle—the raw substance of a thing—is the lowest aspect of its existence. How can this simple matter be called by the complete and composite name of "heavens and earth"? Even more so, how could it be referred to with the definite article ("the heavens and the earth")? This phrase can only refer to something perceived, tangible, and well-known, not to an abstract, lacking, and imperceptible primordial substance that did not even exist in its formless state for more than a fleeting moment.

Second, how is it possible for two separate, formless substances to be created ex nihilo and yet be distinct from one another? Distinction arises from form and function, yet if these substances were entirely without form, how could they be considered separate entities? This aligns with the philosopher’s statement that "that which is in potential cannot be distinguished from another thing that is in potential."

Third, we see that specific forms were also created ex nihilo (yesh me’ayin) in the act of creation. If so, why does the Torah mention the creation of the formless substances but not that of the forms? One cannot argue that the forms were already embedded in the potential of these substances, as Bereishit Rabbah holds regarding material forms, for this is not a true opinion (1)—especially concerning the human form, regarding which all authorities agree, including Bereishit Rabbah himself, that it is not derived from hyle. Even more so, such reasoning is entirely inapplicable to the celestial spheres (galgalim). Whether one holds that they possess souls or separate intellects, it is impossible to suggest that their existence was contained within the potential of matter.

And fourth, our sages have received the tradition that everything created during the Six Days of Creation was brought into existence in its complete and perfected state: "They were created in their full stature, in their complete form, and in their full wisdom." (2)

According to this, those original substances (hyle) could not have been created as mere formless, potential matter without any shape, but rather, they must have been created in their proper form, with their completed structure. And it is astonishing that these sacred commentators—what compelled them to adopt this strained interpretation, suggesting that at first, formless, potential matter was created without form, and that all things later emerged from it? Would it not have been more appropriate to assume that all things were created fully formed and complete from the outset? Why did they choose this view? Is it because the philosophers posited the existence of a primordial, potential substance (hyle) as the underlying matter for all natural existence? Did they seek to align with philosophical reasoning, which holds that becoming (happening) cannot occur from something already actualized, nor can existence emerge from absolute nonexistence? Thus, they accepted the idea that all existence must first require a material substrate—something that exists in potentiality—serving as an intermediary between existence and nonexistence.

However, the portion of Jacob is not like this! For we believe that the world came into being not from any pre-existing substance, but rather, it emerged following absolute nonexistence (ex nihilo) (3). Therefore, there is no need to assume the existence of primordial matter preceding the initial act of creation. Rabbeinu Nissim, however, made an effort in his discourses to present two reasons for why primordial matter was necessary:

First, the Holy One, Blessed be He, wished for the first act of creation to proceed in a way that followed the natural order, rather than bringing multiple things into being from absolute nothingness. Therefore, He first created a single shared substance, from which all lower entities would emerge, and likewise a separate primordial substance from which the upper celestial entities would be formed—since the form of the celestial spheres could not exist in the same material as earthly matter.

Second, the existence of a single, shared primordial matter for all lower beings ensured that humans would be able to sustain themselves from plants and animals—since all things were created for mankind’s benefit. This would not have been possible unless all things on earth originated from a common substance.

But these reasons are not necessary, because even if one accepts his argument regarding the lower beings—that they must have a shared material substance due to their coming into existence and perishing, and because they serve as food for man—what about the celestial beings? They do not experience coming into existence or perishing, and they are not food for man. Why then would they require a shared primordial substance?

. . . 

(1) Abarbanel references Bereishit Rabbah, which discusses whether forms (צורות) exist in potentiality before taking on physical existence. Some philosophers (including Plato and medieval Aristotelians) claimed that all forms pre-existed within matter, but Abarbanel firmly rejects this. He argues that creation must be seen as the direct emergence of full reality, not merely the manifestation of pre-existing potential forms. 

This aligns with the Jewish philosophical tradition, as seen in Sefer HaIkkarim III:10, which argues against the Platonic notion of eternal pre-existing forms.

(2)  This phrase originates from Midrash Bereshit Rabbah 11:6, which states that all creations emerged fully developed. According to the Midrash, Adam, animals, and trees were not created in embryonic or incomplete states but rather as fully grown, mature entities. Abarbanel uses this Midrash as evidence against Ramban’s theory that God first created unformed primordial matter, arguing instead that creation was direct and complete from the outset.

(3)  Abarbanel contrasts the Jewish doctrine of creation ex nihilo (יש מאין) with Aristotle’s concept of hyle (היולי). In Greek philosophy, Aristotle argued that matter must have always existed and that creation is merely the shaping of pre-existing substance. The Ramban partially adopts this idea by proposing that God first created a formless primordial matter, from which all things were later shaped. Abarbanel rejects this view, insisting that God created both matter and form simultaneously. 

For a similar rejection of Aristotelian philosophy, see Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed II:30, where he defends creation ex nihilo against the Greek philosophical model.

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(This excerpt comes from our ongoing translation of Don Isaac Abarbanel’s commentary on the Torah, beginning with Genesis.)