Bereshit (3)

(To read the previous part, click here.)  

All the more so, what prevents God from creating the four fundamental elements (earth, water, air, and fire) with their specific forms from the outset, allowing them to serve as the shared material for all things that come into existence and perish, as well as for human sustenance? Is God's hand, Heaven forbid, too short to create four distinct elements from absolute nothingness—so much so that He must first create one primordial matter instead?

Rather, this entire theory is based on the requirements of natural existence, following the principles of philosophy, rather than on the absolute nature of divine creation, as understood by the Torah. If I were to believe the existence of a primordial matter preceding creation, from which all things later emerged—which is an assertion that is entirely unacceptable from a Torah-based perspective—then I would still prefer to say that a single, unified formless substance was created, from which all celestial and terrestrial beings were formed, rather than assume that two distinct formless substances were created separately. For if one accepts that both the upper and lower worlds were made from a single formless substance, this at least brings us closer to the concept of yesh me’ayin (creation from nothing), in line with the teachings of (those) Torah scholars.

And one cannot argue that if a single shared material substance exists for both the upper and lower realms, it would necessarily follow that either all things must be eternal, or all things must be perishable. This reasoning only applies within the framework of limited natural existence (havayah ha-tivit ha-mugbelet). Meaning: In the natural world, entities that share the same material substance would indeed be expected to share the same properties—either being eternal or being subject to coming into existence and perishing. However, this rule does not apply to the absolute act of first creation (ha-beri'ah ha-rishonah ha-muchletet), which occurred purely according to divine will.

For just as we can say that God, blessed be He, created one primordial matter at the outset, we can also say that He granted one portion of it a form and nature that is fixed and unchanging, giving rise to the celestial bodies and He also granted another portion of it a form and nature that is mutable, subject to coming into existence and perishing, thereby forming the lower world. Since the first act of creation was dictated purely by God's will, there are no external limitations—“Nothing is withheld from the King.” (1) This principle is expressed in Talmud Ta'anit 25a: “He who commanded oil to burn can also command vinegar to burn.” (2) This means that the nature of things exists only as God decrees—it is not predetermined by any intrinsic necessity.

Since the primordial material substance (ha-chomer ha-hu she-nivra berishonah) was inherently prepared to receive any form, once God infused part of it with a fixed, unchanging form, that material remained permanently stable in the upper realms. Meanwhile, when He infused another portion of that same material with the forms of the four elements (earth, water, air, fire), that material remained deficient and continued longing for new forms, constantly transitioning from one form to another to compensate for its inherent deficiencies. As a result, when this primordial matter took on the forms of the four elements, it also acquired qualities that became the causes of decay and destruction, which do not exist in the celestial realms.

However, all of this reasoning should be entirely rejected by those who uphold the faith of the Torah, for it is derived from the methods of the philosophers. “What has the straw to do with the wheat?”(3) (Jeremiah 23:28). This is why I reject the interpretations of these scholars who have veered toward philosophical explanations, for they are not in line with the truth of Torah belief.

The commentators of other nations (mefarshai ha-umot) have interpreted this verse in a different manner. According to them, the Torah first presents the act of creation in a general sense with the statement: “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.” This phrase, they claim, serves as a summary statement (4), referring broadly to the creation of all existing entities—both upper and lower realms—whose specific creation is then detailed throughout the chapter. After this general statement, the Torah begins to describe the particulars of creation, explaining how this act of creation unfolded over the course of the Six Days with the verse: “And the earth was formless and void...” (Veha’aretz hayetah tohu vavohu...).

According to this view, this resolves several difficulties. Why does the Torah not introduce the creation of the heavens and the earth with the phrase “And God said...”? (5) Because this first verse is a general summary rather than a description of an individual act of creation. Why does the Torah not conclude their creation with the phrase “And it was so” (vayehi ken)? Because this phrase is only used in the specific descriptions of each creative act, not in the introductory general statement.

However, this explanation is also incorrect. For according to their interpretation, where in the Torah do we later find an explicit statement about the creation of the earth or the other foundational elements (yesodot)? The Torah does not say about any of these elements: “Let it be so” (yehi ken) or “And it was so” (vayehi ken). Instead, it simply states: “And the earth was formless and void.” But this phrase is not a term of creation—it does not indicate that the earth itself was created, only that it existed in a certain state. Similarly, the verse: “And the spirit of God hovered over the face of the waters” does not indicate an act of creation—neither for the spirit nor for the waters. If the Torah provides no explicit testimony regarding the creation of the fundamental elements, how do we know that they were actually created anew (as opposed to pre-existing)? For all these reasons, none of these interpretations of this verse are acceptable.

. . .

(1) This phrase reflects a fundamental principle in Jewish theology: God’s will is not bound by natural laws. The concept of divine omnipotence in creation is emphasized in Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed (II:25-26), where he argues against the Aristotelian idea that creation follows natural necessity. Abarbanel aligns with this view, insisting that the act of creation was entirely volitional, not dictated by pre-existing principles.

(2) This famous Talmudic passage describes how Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa’s daughter mistakenly poured vinegar into a lamp instead of oil, yet it miraculously burned throughout Shabbat. The story illustrates the principle that natural properties are not absolute but entirely subject to God’s will. Abarbanel cites this to reinforce his argument that there was no necessity for creation to follow “natural” processes—God could just as easily have willed celestial and terrestrial beings into existence without shared material.

(3) "The prophet who has a dream, let him tell a dream, and who has My word, let him tell My word as truth. What has the straw to do with the wheat? says the Lord."

(4) Abarbanel refers to Christian and Islamic interpretations of Bereshit 1:1, many of which align with the Aristotelian concept of eternal matter. Early Christian theologians (such as Origen and Augustine) sometimes interpreted Genesis allegorically, suggesting that the heavens and the earth were created “in potential” before becoming manifest. Medieval Islamic philosophers, like Avicenna, argued that the world’s form was created, but its matter was eternal. Abarbanel rejects these interpretations, seeing them as distortions of the Torah’s absolute affirmation of creation ex nihilo. 

(5) One of the stylistic patterns in the Creation narrative is that each creative act is introduced by “And God said” (ויאמר אלהים). However, this phrase does not appear in Bereshit 1:1. Some commentators, like Rashi and Ibn Ezra, explain that this is because the first verse is not an independent statement of creation, but rather a summary of what follows. Abarbanel strongly rejects this idea, insisting that Bereshit 1:1 is an explicit declaration of creation itself.

To read more... 

(Part of our bilingual project, this passage presents Abarbanel’s insights on Bereshit in clear English.)